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ABSTRACT
Recessions Are Bad for Workplace Safety*
Workplace accidents are an important economic phenomenon. Yet, the pro-cyclical 
fluctuations in workplace accidents are not well understood. They could be related to 
fluctuations in effort and working hours, but workplace accidents may also be affected by 
reporting behavior. Our paper uses unique data on workplace accidents from an Austrian 
matched worker-firm dataset to study in detail how economic incentives affect workplace 
accidents. We find that workers who reported an accident in a particular period of time are 
more likely to be fired later on. And, we find support for the idea that recessions influence the 
reporting of moderate workplace accidents: if workers think the probability of dismissals at 
the firm level is high, they are less likely to report a moderate workplace accident. 
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1 Introduction
Many workers face the risk of being involved in a workplace accident.1 For instance, in the
EU-15 in 2004 there were around 4 million occupational accidents leading to more than
3 days’ absence from work, which is equivalent to an accident rate of 3.2%. The total
number of accidents, including those which did not involve absence from work amounted
to 6.4 million, equivalent to an accident rate of 5.3%.2 The incidence of fatal accidents was
3.8 per 100,000 workers. Finally, annually around 140 million working days are lost due
to non-fatal accidents. The accidents at work are estimated to cause annually costs of 55
billion Euros in EU-15, mostly due to lost working time.
Workplace accidents seem to be related to workplace safety, but cyclical fluctuations
in workplace accidents are puzzling from an economic point of view. There are only few
studies that address this question. Kossoris (1938) is a very early reference to the pro-
cyclical pattern in accident rates. Fairris (1998) shows that in the U.S., manufacturing
injury rates are pro-cyclical. Shea (1990) suggests that variables such as overtime, hiring
and firing rates, the share of non-production workers, and the investment-to-capital ratio
may affect the accident rate over the business cycle. If firms require more hours worked
from employees in booms and less in recessions, then hours worked will be pro-cyclical
and the accident rate (per worker) positively correlated with aggregate fluctuations in the
economy.
It seems obvious that workplace accidents are pro-cyclical because effort and hours
of work are negatively related to unemployment and high effort makes accidents more
likely.3 However, Boone and Van Ours (2006) provide an alternative explanation related to
1According to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work a workplace accident is defined as
a “discrete occurrence in the course of work, which leads to physical or mental harm”. A fatal accident is
defined as an accident, which leads to the death of a victim within 1 year (after the day) of the accident.
The statistical information presented here is from European Commission (2008).
2There is a wide variation in the seriousness of the workplace accidents. Of all accidents in 2004, for
37% of accidents there was no absence from work or only up to three days, for 30% the absence was more
than three days but less than two weeks and for 29% the absence was between two weeks and three months.
Finally, the remaining 4% of accidents concerned an absence of three months or more, or permanent partial
or total disability.
3Ruhm (2000) finds a strong relationship between macroeconomic conditions and mortality, which he
attributes to hazardous working conditions, the physical exertion of employment, and job-related stress
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reporting behavior. Their idea is that in times of high unemployment workers are reluctant
to report workplace accidents because they fear – correctly or incorrectly – that employers
will hold this against them.4 If they are fired in a recession, it will take them a long time to
find a new job. Hence the worker prefers not to report an accident. One way to distinguish
between the two explanations is to study cyclical fluctuations in fatal workplace accidents.
If cycles in workplace safety drive the cycles in workplace accidents this should also be
the case for fatal accidents, which are always reported. If reporting behavior of workers is
relevant then fatal accidents should not be affected by the unemployment rate or changes
in the unemployment rate. Using annual aggregate data from OECD countries Boone
and Van Ours (2006) find that non-fatal workplace accidents are inversely related to the
unemployment rate, while fatal accident rates do not seem to be related to labor market
conditions, which suggests that workplace accidents are indeed influenced by reporting
behavior.
Our paper studies cyclical fluctuations in workplace accidents using micro data. We
have information on workplace accidents of male blue-collar workers from Austrian matched
worker-firm data over the period 2000-2006. Our unique data allow us to investigate in
great detail how economic incentives influence reporting of workplace accidents. We are
able to provide direct tests of the relationships between workplace accidents and firing of
workers. Because we have micro data rather than country-wide data we can test whether
indeed - as suggested in Boone and Van Ours (2006) - a worker is more likely to be laid-off
after experiencing a moderate accident. Furthermore, we are able to investigate directly
whether the firing rate affects the occurrence - through reporting behavior - of workplace
accidents. In Boone and Van Ours (2006) the investigation was limited to cross-national
comparisons. They therefore could not directly test the mechanism by which workplace
accidents affects reporting behavior. Using micro-data allows us to go one step further.
when job hours are extended during short-lasting economic expansions.
4OECD (1989) notes that among social and psychological factors which influence workplace accidents
statistics that “workers may not report injuries because they fear loss of attendance bonuses, or other
personal disadvantages, such as becoming prime candidates for redundancy”. Brooker et al. (1997) finding
that back pain claim rates go down as unemployment goes up mention as possible explanation for this
phenomenon that individuals choose to under-report claims during recessionary periods because they fear
losing their jobs.
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Our new empirical results also allow us to develop a richer theoretical model with more
interesting welfare analysis and policy implications.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical model that explains
the accident reporting behavior of individual workers. Workers are heterogeneous with
respect to accident proneness and an accident reveals the innate probability of a worker
to experience an accident. Workers report accidents because once reported firms invest in
prevention. We show that workers become less eager to report accidents the higher the
probability that the firm needs to fire a worker because then it may be more profitable
for a firm to fire the worker rather than invest in prevention. We also show that more
serious accidents are more often reported because the prevention of such accidents is more
important for a worker. Section 3 describes the data on workplace accidents from our
Austrian dataset. Section 4 discusses the statistical model and presents estimation results.
We find that workers who reported an accident in a particular period of time are more likely
to be fired later on. Apparently, when deciding about whom to fire in case of a negative
demand shock employers take the accident history of workers into account. And, we find
support for the idea that recessions have a disciplinary effect concerning the reporting of
workplace accidents: if workers think the probability of dismissals at the firm level is high,
they are less likely to report a moderate accident. For severe accidents we find no such
effect. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
We introduce a model in which workers who experience a moderate work-related accident
can decide whether to report such an accident or not. If a worker reports the accident, the
firm will make an investment to accommodate the workplace that reduces the probability
of an accident to this worker in the next period. To see more precisely what we have in
mind, consider the example of a nurse working in a hospital. One of her tasks is to lift
people out of bed and help them into their wheelchair. Using the correct lifting techniques
this can be done without causing back problems. However, the patient may lose his balance
causing the nurse to overstretch her back. As a result, the nurse may (or may not) hurt
her back. Having observed this accident, the firm may decide that the nurse is no longer
allowed to lift patients out of bed on her own but instead has to get help from a colleague
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(or the beds of her patients are fitted with a device that facilitates lifting them).
More generally, think of a firm that obeys the general safety regulation rules and imple-
ments all accident prevention investments that are profitable to do for everyone. Neverthe-
less the firm may be willing to incur an additional cost that accommodates the individual’s
workplace once the firm has got additional information on the worker’s individual accident
risk. Of course, such workplace accommodation measures will be profitable for accident-
prone workers but may not be profitable for workers with a small (individual) accident
risk.
The main difference of our model compared to the one of Boone and Van Ours (2006) is
the following. In Boone and Van Ours (2006) reporting an accident leads to a compensation
(that varies with the severity of the accident) to the worker. In the model below, reporting
an accident leads to investments to prevent future accidents. This makes the welfare
analysis more interesting. Whereas there can only be under-reporting of accidents in Boone
and Van Ours (2006), in the model below there can also be over-reporting of accidents.
2.1 Positive analysis
Consider a two period model. In the first period, a firm has two workers. If an accident
happens, a worker can report the accident by the end of the period. To simplify the
exposition, assume that accidents are verifiable, once reported. Hence it does not make
sense to report an accident that did not happen. At the end of the first period there is
an (exogenous) probability δ that demand for the firm’s products falls which forces firm is
forced to fire one of the two employees. Once the firm knows whether a worker stays or
not, it can decide on worker-specific accident-prevention measures.
We assume that workers differ in type q ∈ [0, 1] where q denotes the innate probability
of a worker to experience an accident. This probability q is distributed with density
(distribution) function f(q)(F (q)). Before an accident happens, neither the worker, nor
the firm knows q, only the distribution of q. If an accident happens, the worker experiences
(expected) damage αw and the firm αf . We assume that the damage is independent of a
worker’s type. After the accident happened, the worker (but not the firm) learns q. The
worker learns how likely he is to have a (similar) accident in the next period. While, after
an accident, the worker’s q is not observable the firm, the firm updates its beliefs about
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the worker’s q.5,6
The firm can invest γ in worker specific prevention of the accident. After the investment,
the probability that type q is involved in an accident is denoted by qγ ≤ q where we assume
that
d(q − qγ)
dq
> 0 (1)
The prevention technology leads to a bigger fall in the accident probability for more accident
prone workers. Basically, there is more to gain for high q workers.7 We assume that it is
not profitable to invest in the accident prevention technology for every worker:
E(q − qγ)αf ≶ γ (2)
where E(q) =
∫
qdF (q) denotes the (prior) expected probability of an accident.
Now consider the case where a worker has reported an accident. The posterior distri-
bution is then given by
f(q|A) = qf(q)∫ 1
0 tdF (t)
(3)
We assume that it is profitable to invest in prevention, once a worker has reported an
accident:
E(q − qγ |A)αf > γ (4)
5Assuming that the worker learns q (perfectly) simplifies notation. The important feature is that the
worker’s posterior distribution of q is more informative than the firm’s posterior.
6In fact, after the accident the firm would like to learn q. One way to screen workers on q after the
accident is to offer them a choice between receiving an amount of money (“bribe”) or the firm investing in
safety measures. To the best of our knowledge, offering such a choice to workers is illegal.
7To illustrate things, consider again the nurse in the hospital. The patient may lose his balance causing
the nurse to overstretch her back with probability λ. Given that this situation arises, the nurse’s has
individual probability q˜ that she hurts her back, hence the ex-ante probability of an accident is q = λq˜.
After the accident the nurse knows whether her back is likely to be strained again in a similar future
situation (q˜ close to 1). Alternatively, she may have hurt herself at home the day before which weakened
her back. Therefore, although she hurt her back in this incident she is unlikely to get hurt in a similar
situation in the future. When the hospital decides that the nurse is no longer allowed to lift patients out of
bed on her own but has to get help from a colleague, the probability of ending up in a hazardous situation
is reduced from λ to λγ < λ. Indeed we find that d((λ− λγ)q˜)/dq˜ > 0 in this example.
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where E(q|A) = ∫ qdF (q|A). In words, once a worker has reported an accident, the firm
knows that the worker is accident prone and investment in prevention becomes profitable.
This effect gives an incentive for a worker to report an accident (see below). Note that the
firm makes its investment decision without knowing q for the worker since q is not revealed
to the firm. We also assume that it is not profitable to replace a worker who has reported
an accident in the first period. Let C denote the firing and rehiring cost. It is assumed
that, a worker who produces surplus y and receives wage w, we always have
y − w − γ − E(qγ |A)αf > −C + y − w − E(q)αf . (5)
That is, investing γ and reducing the probability of an accident is more profitable than
investing search cost C and employing a new worker who has an accident with expected
probability E(q).
If a worker loses the job, he or she receives b < w as expected value of being unemployed.
This consists of a probability of finding a new job in the next period8 and unemployment
benefit if no other job is found. We assume that a worker prefers to stay in his job at the
start of the first period:
w − E(q)αw > b (6)
Similarly, every type q prefers to stay in the second period, if the firm invests in prevention:
w − qγαw > b (7)
for each type qγ . In other words, no worker voluntarily quits after reporting an accident.
Now consider the worker’s incentive to report an accident in the first period. On the
one hand, reporting the accident has a potential benefit to the worker. If the accident is
reported, it is optimal for the firm (equation (4)) to invest in workplace accommodation
which reduces the accident probability for the worker from q to qγ . On the other hand,
reporting the accident has also a potential cost. If the firm is hit by a negative demand
shock (which happens with probability δ), the firm is better off firing the worker. (If either
8To ease notation, we assume that the probability of having an accident in the next job –in case the
worker is fired– does not depend on a worker’s current q. That is, q is specific to the worker-firm match.
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none or two workers reported an accident, the firm is indifferent in firing either employee.
In that case, an employee is chosen with probability 12 .
9)
Given that a worker is the only one who experienced an accident in the first period, his
expected pay off from reporting is given by
δb+ (1− δ)(w − qγαw) (8)
If the negative shock hits the firm, it will fire the worker who has reported the accident,
save on the accommodation expenditure γ and get a lower probability of future accidents
for the remaining worker (as E(q|A) > E(q)). If the worker is fired, he receives b < w. If
the worker does not report the accident, his pay off equals
1
2δb+ (1− 12δ)(w − qαw) (9)
Hence a worker reports if and only if the expression in equation (8) exceeds (9); which can
be rewritten as
1
2δq + (1− δ)(q − qγ) > 12
δ(w − b)
αw
(10)
Because of assumption (1), the left hand side is increasing in q. Hence there is a critical
value q∗ such that the inequality is satisfied for all q > q∗. Thus the (ex-ante) probability
that the worker reports an accident is 1− F (q∗).
We find the following result.
Proposition 1 As δ increases, the probability that an accident is reported falls. As αw
increases, it becomes more likely that an accident is reported. As αw increases, the effect
of δ on q∗ is reduced.
Proof of proposition 1 Let q∗ denote the value for q where (10) holds with equality.
Then it is routine to verify that
dq∗
dδ
=
w−b
2αw
− 12q∗γ + 12(q∗ − q∗γ)
1
2δ + (1− δ)
d(q∗−q∗γ)
dq∗
> 0 (11)
9Note that in the second (final) period it is immaterial whether a worker reports an accident or not. No
further accidents can be prevented and there is no firing decision by the firm.
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where the inequality follows from equations (1), (7) and q − qγ > 0. If αw increases, the
right hand side of (10) falls and q∗ falls as well. Finally, an increase in αw reduces dq∗/dδ
in equation (11). Hence, q∗ is less dependent on δ as αw increases. Q.E.D.
The intuition is as follows. The higher the probability that the firm needs to fire a
worker, the less eager workers become in reporting accidents. More serious accidents (higher
αw) are more often reported, since the prevention of such accidents is more important
for a worker. Finally, the reporting of more serious accidents is less dependent on the
expectations about the firing rate δ.
Notice that our simple model yields empirically testable predictions which will be an-
alyzed in the empirical analysis below. In particular, we will not only investigate whether
accident reporting increases in booms and decreases in regressions but we will also test
whether the cyclicality in reporting behavior is different between moderate and severe
workplace accidents.
2.2 Welfare analysis
We conclude the section by summarizing the normative implications of the model. There
are two main imperfections that cause the equilibrium above to deviate from the socially
optimal outcome. First, both the worker and the firm only consider their own payoffs not
the sum of payoffs. To illustrate, equation (2) implies that it is not profitable for the firm
to invest for every worker. However, if we have
E(q − qγ)(αf + αw) > γ (12)
it is socially desirable that such an investment is made (ex ante) for every worker. Second,
after an accident the worker learns his own q but cannot credibly reveal this to the employer.
Hence the firm bases its investment decision on f(q|A) while it is socially optimal to base
this decision on q. Related to this, the decision to fire a worker (with probability δ) after
an accident should also be based on q and not on the accident itself. If the worker has
accident probability q < E(q) the social planner prefers the workplace accommodating
investment to firing the worker. However, when q > E(q)) even the social planner prefers
to fire a worker rather than investing in prevention of a further accident.
In the model above, reporting an accident leads the firm to invest in worker-specific
safety measures (if the worker is not fired). Hence for all q > q∗ (where q∗ solves equation
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(10) with equality) the firm invests. Given that a worker is not fired after being involved
in an accident, for which values of q is it socially optimal to invest?
Lemma 2 It is socially optimal to invest in safety measures for a worker with q > qs
where qs is defined by
(qs − qsγ) =
γ
αw + αf
(13)
Since we assume that q−qγ is increasing in q, there is a unique value for qs that satisfies
equation (13). For q < qs the gain in safety (qs − qsγ)(αw + αf ) due to the investment is
too small to cover the cost γ.
Proposition 3 Assume that the solution qs to equation (13) satisfies
qs <
w − b
αw
then there exists δ∗ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 such that for δ < δ∗ the firm over-invests in safety measures
compared to the social optimum while for δ > δ∗ the firm under-invests.
Proof of proposition 3 First, consider δ = 0. Then equation (10) implies that each
worker q ∈ [0, 1] reports his accident, inducing the firm to invest in safety. However, such
investment is only optimal for q > qs > 0. Hence for low δ we have over-investment in
safety measures. Second, consider δ = 1. Comparing equations (8) and (9), it follows that
workers q report who satisfy
w − qαw < b
That is, workers who prefer to be unemployed rather than to continue working without
additional safety measures report their accident (and get fired with probability 1). If it is
the case that
w − qsαw > b
type qs does not report in equilibrium while this would be socially optimal. Hence under the
assumption made in the proposition, there is under-reporting and hence under-investment
for δ close to 1. Finally, note that qs does not depend on δ while equation (11) implies that
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q∗ is increasing in δ. Hence there exists δ∗ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 such that there is over(under)-investment
for δ > (<)δ∗. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When the probability of being fired is small,
workers report each accident thereby inducing the firm to invest even though they know
their probability of having another accident q is actually quite low. However, for δ close to
zero, there are no costs for the worker of doing this (probability of being fired is close to
zero) and the firm bases its decision on the posterior distribution (3) not on the realization
of q.
When the probability of being fired is high, workers do not report even though they
learned that the probability of an accident q and therefore the gain from prevention q− qγ
is high. In this case, the firm does not invest even though such investment would be
socially optimal. The interpretation of this result is as follows. Recessions are bad for
workplace safety in the sense that they lead to under-reporting of accidents and therefore
to underinvestment in prevention. In booms there is over-investment in workplace safety.
Thus booms are “too good” for workplace safety. Accident-prevention investments are
made that are wasteful from a social point of view but beneficial for workers.
If the government feels that generally speaking there is underinvestment in accident
prevention, one policy option is to impede the discrimination in firing of workers who
reported an accident. This gives firms a commitment device not to fire an employee in
response to an accident report, thereby raising employees’ incentive to report accidents.
Given equation (12), this increases the bilateral surplus for the firm and the worker. One
way in which this additional surplus can be shared is that the firm lowers the wage which
the worker accepts as she now works in a safer workplace. At first sight, one may argue
that the government does not need to intervene if this commitment is profitable to the
firm. However, if the worker (but not the firm) knows how accident-prone he or she is
(at the time of the hiring), firms that unilaterally introduce this commitment will tend to
attract accident prone workers. This makes the unilateral introduction of this commitment
unprofitable. Hence government action is called for that commits all firms not to fire
workers that reported an accident with a higher probability.
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3 Firing rates and the incidence of reported workplace ac-
cidents
3.1 Background
Our data are from the Austrian Social Insurance for Occupational Risks (AUVA) which
covers all employees except federal railway employees and civil servants (2.8 million). The
AUVA defines an occupational accident as “an unexpected external event causing injury,
in locational, temporal and causal relationship to the insured occupation”.10 By law,
occupational accidents, due to which an insured person is more than 3 days incapable of
working – including fatal accidents – are required to be reported within 5 days. In 2007,
roughly 110,000 occupational accidents were reported. In case of an occupational accident
the employer is legally obligated to continued remuneration of the victim for 8-10 weeks,
depending on the job tenure of the worker. The cost of the curative treatment associated
with the occupational accident is covered by the AUVA (the 2007 budget amounted to e
950 million).
3.2 Data
The mandatory nature of the accident insurance implies that the AUVA keeps track of all
reported workplace accidents. The data available to us covers workplace accidents that
were reported between 2000 and 2006.11 In addition to the exact accident date, the AUVA
data contains detailed information on the severity of accidents along four dimensions: (i)
the number of inpatient care days, (ii) the number of days absent from work (excluding
inpatient care days), (iii) whether the accident caused a reduction in the ability to work
(i.e. whether the victim receives a (partial) disability pension as a result of the accident),
and (iv) whether the accident is fatal. Moreover, it includes some information on the firm
10Activities in connection with the insured occupation, e.g. commuting to and from the workplace are
covered by this insurance as well.
11More precisely, the data contains all workplace accidents of which the corresponding claims were rec-
ognized in 2000-2007. There is a time lag between reporting and recognition of accidents. For example,
93.0 % of claims in 2000, were recognized in the same year and another 6.6 % in the subsequent year. So,
almost all claims are dealt within the same or the subsequent year. Because of this we ignore the workplace
accidents that occurred in 2007, because for this year the records may be incomplete.
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(such as industry affiliation) and the worker (such as whether a worker holds a blue– or
white–collar occupation).
The unique feature of our dataset consists of a personal identifier which allows us
to match the workplace accidents to individual data from the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD, see Zweimu¨ller et al. 2009 for details). The ASSD contains detailed
information on individuals’ employment status and earnings on a daily basis. It also
contains some information on the employer, like regional location, industry affiliation,
and a firm identifier. This enables us not only to derive the employment history of each
individual, but also to characterize every single firm at each reference date in terms of its
firm size, employment flows, and mean characteristics of their employees.12
Workplace accidents are a rare event which makes it difficult to study their interaction
with firing rates. Therefore, we focus on a subset of Austrian workers and industries
with relatively high accident rates, which, at the same time, is also important in terms of
employment shares. We restrict our sample to male blue–collar workers aged 25–49 who
are employed in manufacturing with at least 100 employees. In this sample, 97.8 % of
occupational accidents observed in the AUVA data could be matched to a corresponding
employment record in the ASSD data.13 In the empirical analysis we work with longitudinal
12Note, however, that 3.4 % workplace accidents cannot be matched unambiguously. This occurs when
an individual holds more than one job. Workplace accidents for those individuals cannot be directly linked
to an employer, since the AUVA data does not contain a firm identifier. We applied the following procedure
in case of an unambiguous match: we matched the workplace accident to that employment spell, which was
– based on information that is available in both data sets – the most likely. More precisely, we chose the
most likely match by first ensuring consistency of the industry classification, second ensuring consistency of
the type of employment (blue – vs. white–collar), and finally, if the match was still ambiguous, we simply
chose the longest employment spell in question.
13The following figures highlight the high accident rates of our subgroup (all refer to the year 2000).
Male workers were almost three times more likely involved in an accident than female workers (5.9 vs. 2.0
accidents per 100 workers); the number of accidents per 100 workers amounts to 7.0 among blue-collar
workers and to only 1.6 among workers wearing a white–collar; the accident rate of prime-age workers
(3.8 percent) is higher than for older workers (3.4); the manufacturing industry is faced with an accident
rate of 6.0 percent – the second highest among all industries (compared to e.g. 4.8 percent in agriculture
and forestry, 2.8 percent in retail, 2.6 percent in tourism, 4.3 in utilities, and 0.7 percent in banking and
insurance; the accident rate in the construction sector is higher with 8.7 percent, but this sector is not
adequate for our analysis due to its highly seasonal pattern in employment); and large firms are faced
with 5.3 accidents per 100 workers while this number only amounts to 3.2 in small firms. The number
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data (monthly reference dates) containing individuals that are employed at the reference
date. For this sample, a total of 64,080 workplace accidents are reported in the AUVA
data during the period 2000–2006.14
3.3 Definition of variables
The two crucial variables for the empirical analysis are (i) a measure for the degree of
severity of an occupational accident and (ii) a measure that captures the probability that
demand for the firm’s products falls. These variables are defined as follows. We distinguish
two types of accidents, moderate and severe ones. This distinction should capture whether
or not the reporting of an occupational accident is at discretion of the workers. In regard of
this, we define an accident to be moderate if it simply results in a positive number of days
absent from work (excluding inpatient care days). We define an occupational accident as
severe otherwise, i.e. if it results in a positive number of inpatient care days, in a (partial)
disability pension, or if it is fatal. This classification is a robust one for two reasons. First,
it is implausible that severe accidents are over–reported, since a worker would have to
fake an injury that brings him into hospital or one that makes him eligible to a partial
disability pension. Second, severe accidents are very unlikely to be under–reported, since
the experienced damage to the worker αw is likely to be very high (high enough to end
up in hospital or to suffer from a permanent reduction in work capacity). In contrast, our
measure of moderate accidents is potentially subject to a reporting decision.
We define the measure for the probability that a firm will face a fall in demand for
their products as the fraction of the workforce a firm lays off from t− 1 to t. We therefore
assume that the workers’ best predictor at t for the probability of an adverse demand shock
of accidents per 100 workers for our specific subgroup amounts to 10.7. The manufacturing industry
has by far the biggest employment share accounting for 22 percent of total employment. Furthermore,
male workers account for 55 percent of total employment and prime age workers for 66 percent. Blue-
collar workers (workers in large firms) are with an employment share of 47 percent (46 percent) slightly
underrepresented though. The employment share of our specific subgroup amounts to 4 percent with respect
to total employment.
14A comparison of the situation in Austria with that in the U.S. shows that accident rates for manufac-
turing workers are lower in Austria than in the U.S. in the year 2000. While 7.8 accidents per 100 workers
were reported in the U.S., only 6.0 were reported in Austria (the figure for the U.S. is taken from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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in t+ 1 is the firm’s human resource planning (i.e. firing decisions) in t. We define “fired”
as a worker who is employed in t − 1 and either unemployed or out–of–labor force in t.15
Note that the firing rate is based on the entire workforce of each firm (i.e. including workers
of all ages, white–collar workers, women, and industries other than manufacturing) and
not on our restricted sample. Moreover, all regressions will additionally include a variable
capturing the general business cycle measured by the monthly unemployment rate for male
workers in manufacturing at the state level as well as calendar month and year dummies.
However, our results also hold when we do not include aggregate business cycle indicators,
so that firm firing rate reflects both idiosyncratic risk and the state of the aggregate business
cycle.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides general information about the accidents we observe in our sample. As
shown our sample contains about 60,000 moderate workplace accidents and about 4,000
severe workplace accidents. On average a moderate accident causes a 12.5 days absenteeism,
while for severe accidents this is 72.3 days. While for moderate accidents hardly anyone
is absent for a long time, 27.2 percent of the workers who had a severe accident were
absent for more than 3 months. More than half of the severe accidents lead to permanent
disability. Commuting accidents are included in the registered accidents. Table 1 shows
that 5.7 percent of all accidents are commuting-related. Among moderate accidents this
number amounts to 5.3 percent and among severe accidents to 12.5 percent.
Table 2 provides summary statistics at the level of the individual worker and the level of
the firm. The first column shows that our final data contains 9,263,282 individual–month
observations (based on 205,170 workers who work in 1,256 different firms). Each worker has
on average a risk of 0.7 percent to get involved in an occupational accident at each reference
date, which is rather a low number. Considering the whole 2000–2006 period changes this
picture. Almost one–third of all workers report at least one occupational accident over this
period. Firms have a mean firing rate of 1.3 percent. The average unemployment rate in
the manufacturing industry for male workers is 5.0 percent. The average worker can be
15A worker who is employed and then either moves to another firm or retires (old–age or disability–related)
is not considered “fired”.
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characterized as follows: he is aged 37.4 years, employed in the same firm since 9.2 years,
has work experience of 18.1 years, was on sick leave for 0.3 percent in the last 2 years, and
earns e 81.2 a day. The second column of Table 2 provides companion information at the
level of the firm (i.e. the average values of their workforce of male, blue–collar workers aged
25–49 years).
Table 2 about here
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Econometric model
This section describes the empirical methodology. We focus on two main issues. First, our
empirical analysis will address the question whether workers who report an accident are
in fact exposed to a higher risk of subsequent job loss. Second, we empirically investigate,
whether reported workplace accidents vary over the business cycle and how the cyclicality
in reporting behavior differs between severe and more moderate workplace accidents. This
second analysis forms the basis of our empirical investigation.
The following regression equation allows us to test whether workers who have recently
reported an accident are those that are fired with a higher probability
yit+1 = κ · prait +Xf ′it · β + ψfi + φfj(i)t + πft + νit (14)
where yi+1t indicates whether or not a worker i is fired in period t + 1 as a function of
current and past accidents that worker i has reported at his current firm j (prait), control
variables Xfit, worker fixed–effects (ψ
f
i ), firm fixed–effects (φ
f
j(i)t), and calendar month and
year dummies (πft ). The control variables X
f
it include a constant, the state unemployment
rate for male, blue–collar workers, the sickness rate of the last 2 years of worker i in firm
j (and its square), the daily wage (in logs), age (and its square), tenure (and its square),
and experience (and its square). νit is an error term satisfying the usual assumption which
captures unobservable (to the researcher) factors influencing the reporting of occupational
accidents. The prediction from our theoretical model is correct if the sign of κ is positive.
The following regression equation studies the cyclical behavior of accident reporting
ait = δ · fj(i),t +Xa′it · β + ψai + φaj(i)t + πat + it, (15)
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where ait indicates whether individual i reports an accident in t, fjt is the firing rate of
firm j at time t, ψai are worker fixed–effects, φ
a
j(i)t are firm fixed–effects and π
a
t represent
calendar month and year dummies. The control variables Xait include a constant, the
sickness rate of the last 2 years of worker i in firm j (and its square), the daily wage (in
logs), age (and its square), tenure (and its square), and experience (and its square), and
it is an error term satisfying the usual assumption which captures unobservable (to the
researcher) factors influencing the reporting of occupational accidents. We estimate this
regression equation separately for moderate and severe occupational accidents using all
worker–month observations with a moderate occupational accident together with worker-
months observations without any accident, and all worker–month observations with a severe
occupational accident together with worker-months observations without any accident.
4.2 Parameter estimates
4.2.1 Does reporting an accident increase the subsequent firing rate?
We start our analysis by investigating whether the workers who reported an accident are
exposed to a higher risk of job loss as compared to workers who did not report an accident.
The existence of a significant impact of a previous accident on the risk of subsequent job
loss is of obvious importance in the present context. Our theoretical reasoning builds
upon the idea that an incentive not to report a workplace accidence arises exactly because
accident reporting may increase the subsequent probability of getting fired. If the accident
reporting behavior would be unrelated to the risk of job loss, the mechanism emphasized
in this paper would not be relevant.
Table 3 shows the results of the impact of previous accident reporting (within the last
twelve months) on the current probability of job loss. Columns (1)–(4) use the overall
accident reporting during the last 12 months as the independent variable. Column (5)
additionally allows for differential effects by the degree of severeness. It turns out that
reporting any accident in the previous year, leads to a substantial increase in the probability
of being laid off in the current month (column (1)). This effect is robust to the inclusion
of worker fixed effects (column (2)), firm fixed effects (column (3)), and the inclusion of
both worker as well as firm fixed effects (column (4)). Taking column (4) as our preferred
specification (controlling for firm and worker characteristics that persist over time), the
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point estimate suggests that the firing probability is 0.15 percentage points higher for
workers who have reported any accident within the last twelve months. This effect compares
to an average firing rate of 0.75 percent in our sample. Hence we conclude that the impact
of accident reporting on the risk of subsequent job loss is substantial, and equal to roughly
20 percent of the average firing rate in the sample. When we allow for differential impacts
of moderate and severe accidents in Column (5) we see that the effect is mainly driven
by moderate accidents whereas the impact of previous severe accidents is insignificant.
The fact that severe accidents do not have an impact on subsequent job loss may seem
surprising. However, this result is reconciled by the fact that workers who have a severe
accident are more likely to benefit from higher job protection than those who have a
moderate accident.16 In sum, our results strongly support the assumption made in section
2, that accident reporting behavior has a significant impact on the probability of being laid
off later on.
Table 3 further shows that the unemployment rate has a significant effect on the indi-
vidual probability to be fired. This effect is not surprising and represents a business cycle
effect. If the economy is in a recession workers are more likely to lose their job. The impact
is quantitatively important. A one percentage point increase in the contemporaneous unem-
ployment rate leads to a 21 percent higher probability to be fired (= [0.1589/100]/0.0075)).
Moreover, we infer from Table 3 that a higher sickness rate within the last two years leads
to a higher firing probability. This suggests that a similar mechanism as for accident rates
may be at work for sickness rates.17
16In general, there is no particular job protection for those workers who are on sick leave due to an
occupational accident (or illness) in Austria. However, if an accident leads to a permanent reduction in
work capacity of 50 percent or more, an automatic process of acquiring the status of a disabled worker in
the context of the Austrian Disabled Persons Employment Act (Behinderteneinstellungsgesetz ) is launched.
Once this process is launched, a worker has substantially increased job protection (dismissal is only valid if
a special disability committee by the Austrian federal welfare office agrees to it). While moderate accidents
do not lead to a permanent reduction in work capacity by construction, severe accidents do so in more than
50 percent of all instances (see Table 1). Thus, those workers who report a severe accidents are likely to
be more strongly protected by legislation than those who report a moderate accident, which reconciles the
puzzling result that there is no association between reporting a severe accident and being fired.
17See for example Barmby et al. (1994) who indicate that the effect of absence behavior on the probability
of being fired may act as a worker discipline device.
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Table 3 about here
4.2.2 Does accident reporting behavior vary over the business cycle?
Our estimate of main interest concerns the cyclicality of accident reporting behavior. We
report results of the effect of the firing rate on the probability to report an accident in
table 4 where separate parameter estimates for moderate (Panel A) and severe (Panel B)
accidents are presented. We report results on four different specifications that differ by the
inclusion of worker and/or firm fixed effects. If neither worker nor firm fixed-effects are
included (column (1)), then the effect of the firing rate on the probability of reporting a
moderate accident is not significantly different from zero. When we include worker fixed
effects, in contrast, we do find a significant negative effect. An increase of the firing rate
by one standard deviation (= 0.0192, see Table 2) decreases the probability of reporting
a moderate accident by 2.1 percent (= [0.0192 · (−0.0072)]/0.0065). Apparently, adding
worker fixed-effects (e.g. controlling for workers’ ability to prevent a moderate workplace
accident) is important. Put differently (and assuming that worker fixed effect are the
only left-out confounders in column (1)), workers’ time-invariant traits that reduce the
probability of reporting a moderate workplace accident are negatively correlated with the
firing rate. Column (3) replaces the worker fixed-effects by firm fixed-effects, which control
inter alia for job safety measures provided by the employer. It turns out that the effect
is now also significantly different from zero. This implies (assuming that the only left-out
confounders are firm fixed effects in column (1)) that any workplace characteristics provided
by the employer that reduce the probability of reporting moderate accidents by workers
are negatively correlated with the firing rate. The results in column (2) and column (3)
as compared to column (1) are in line with empirical findings in the compensating wage
differential literature that more able workers sort into jobs with positive job characteristics
(see e.g. Hwang et al. 1992). Column (4) includes worker as well as firm fixed effects, which
is our preferred specification. Column (4) suggests that increasing the firing rate by one
standard deviation leads to a 2.1 percent decrease in the probability to report a moderate
accident. Notice further that all regressions in Table 4 control for the general business
cycle (by including a dummy for each calendar year) as well as for seasonal effects (by
including a dummy for each calendar month). Hence the estimated cyclical effects arise
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from idiosyncratic variations in the firing rates, holding the business cycle and seasonal
effects constant. However, robustness checks show that removing year fixed effects to
account for the business cycle does not affect our results (see below and the discussion
paper version of our paper). The relationship between the firing rate and the reporting
behavior of severe workplace accidents is investigated in Panel B of table 4. We perform
exactly the same regressions as we do for moderate workplace accidents. The results show
that the firing rate does not have any statistically significant impact on workers’ reporting
behavior with respect to severe workplace accidents. This finding strongly supports our
alternative explanation of the cyclical fluctuations in moderate workplace accident rates.
Table 4 about here
The larger a firm is the higher the risk that at least one occupational accident is
reported, simply because they employ more workers. In addition, larger firms generally tend
to have lower firing rates, which may suggest a mechanical interpretation for the negative
relationship between the incidence of an accident and the expected firing rate. Therefore,
we also performed an analysis at the level of the firm.18 Table 5 shows the parameter
estimates. We also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the inclusion of firm fixed
effects as already done in table 4 by presenting results without including firm fixed effects
(column (1)) and with including firm fixed effects (column (2)). It turns out that the results
based at the level of the firm are very much in line with the estimates based on individual
data. In column (1) we again see that the firing rate is unrelated to the probability of
reporting an moderate accident if firm fixed effects are not controlled for. Including firm
fixed effects changes the picture. Column (2) shows that an increase in the firing rate by
one standard deviation (= 0.0275, see table 2) reduces the probability that a firm faces at
least one moderate workplace accident by 1.5 percent (= [0.0275 · (−0.2066)]/0.3698). The
probability that a firm faces at least one severe accident, in contrast, is unrelated to the
firing rate. The analysis at the level of the firm thus strongly supports our findings derived
at the level of the worker.
18The variation in the firing rate used in Table 4 is only at the level of the firm and we therefore presented
standard errors adjusted for clustering on the firm in addition to those clustered on workers. Performing
the analysis directly at the firm level is an alternative approach to account for this.
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To further investigate the robustness of our findings we also performed additional sensi-
tivity analyses. First, we investigated the relevance of commuting accidents. As indicated
in section 3.4, commuting accidents are substantially overrepresented among severe acci-
dents. Our results are unaffected by this overrepresentation unless the reporting behavior
between workplace and commuting accidents differs (e.g. if commuting accidents are al-
ways reported). To investigate this issue we excluded commuting-related accidents and
re-estimated the impact of the expected firing rate on the reporting of accidents. As shown
in Table 6, the results are very robust to the exclusion of commuting accidents suggesting
that the reporting behavior between accidents during commuting and at the workplace
does not differ. We conclude that the presence of commuting accidents does not change
the interpretation of our results. Second, we investigated how sensitive our results are to
the inclusion of year fixed effects in the estimates presented in table 4. Year fixed effects
may absorb too much of the variation in the business cycle. As shown in Table 7, exclud-
ing year fixed effects from the estimates does not affect the relevant parameter estimates.
This suggests that the firm-specific variation we use does indeed capture the macro-level
variation we want. Finally, we checked whether our results are robust to the inclusion of all
workers by treating severe accidents as non-accidents if moderate accidents are investigated
(and vice versa). Table 8 shows that our results do not change if all workers are included
in the analysis.
To sum up, our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical predictions. Work-
ers who report a workplace accident in the previous year are more likely to be laid off.
This suggests that when deciding about whom to fire employers take the accident history
of workers into account. We have also shown that while the probability of reporting a
moderate accident is governed by firms’ firing rate, this is not true for severe accidents.
Recall that the distinction between moderate and severe workplace accidents reflects the
extent to which the reporting of such an accident is at the discretion of the workers. The
results suggest that the higher the firm’s firing rate, the more reluctant their workers are to
report a moderate workplace accident. We do not find such a pattern for severe workplace
accidents. Hence, our findings are consistent with the idea that the reporting behavior is
the driving force behind the pro-cyclicality of the incidence of workplace accidents. Our
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data do not allow to determine whether moderate workplace accidents are rather over–
reported in booms or under–reported in recessions. The results simply tell that moderate
workplace accidents are relatively less reported in recessions. To the extent that our model
captures the main aspect that drive workers’ reporting decisions and firms’ workplace-
safety investment decisions our evidence is consistent with the idea that recessions are bad
for workplace safety due to underinvestment in accident prevention.
5 Conclusions
Workplace accidents are related to workplace safety. Nevertheless, cyclical fluctuations in
workplace accidents are puzzling from an economic point of view. Workplace accidents
could be pro-cyclical because effort and hours of work are negatively related to unemploy-
ment and because higher work effort makes accidents more likely. Hence we should see more
accidents during a boom and less during a recession. Alternatively, cyclical fluctuations in
workplace accidents may be related to reporting behavior. In times of high unemployment
workers are reluctant to report workplace accidents because they fear that employers will
hold this against them. In this paper we investigate this alternative explanation using
high-quality Austrian matched worker-firm data containing information about workplace
accidents of blue-collar workers in manufacturing. We find that workers who reported an
accident in particular period of time are more likely to be fired later on. Apparently, when
deciding about whom to fire, employers take the accident history of workers into account.
Moreover, we find support for the idea that recessions affect the reporting of workplace
accidents: if the probability to be dismissed is high, workers are less likely to report a
moderate accident. For severe accidents we do not find such an effect.
The cyclical sensitivity of the incidence of workplace accidents appears to be related
to reporting behavior. As indicated in the theoretical part of the paper the cyclical fluc-
tuations in reporting behavior has clear welfare implications as investments in prevention
of workplace accidents may be suboptimal. If in recessions firing rates go up workers may
underreport workplace accidents and thus firms under-invest in workplace safety. In booms
workers may over-report workplace accidents and therefore firms over-invest in workplace
safety, i.e. although workers benefit from the investments in workplace safety they are
wasteful from a social point of view.
22
In light of our theoretical analysis, our empirical evidence suggests that recessions are
bad for workplace safety. From the point of view of economic policy, a way to bring the
economy closer to the social optimum would be to introduce measures that impede the
discrimination in firing against workers who reported an accident. This would increase the
incentive of firms to invest in workplace safety also during recessions.
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Table 1: Characteristics of accidents
All Moderate Severe
Type of Accident (in %)
Workplace 94.3 94.7 87.5
Commuting 5.7 5.3 12.5
Missed work days
Days absent 16.1 12.5 72.3
Days at home 15.4 12.5 59.8
Days at hospital 0.7 − 12.5
Distribution (in %)
0 days absent 19.5 20.6 3.1
1–3 days absent 5.2 5.0 8.6
4–13 days absent 39.9 41.8 10.4
14–90 days absent 33.5 32.3 50.7
91–∞ days absent 1.9 0.3 27.2
Severity
Fatal (in %) 0.0 − 1.5
Permanent disability (in %) 3.1 − 51.5
Number of accidents 64,080 60,172 3,908
Source: Own Calculations, based on AUVA, ASSD, and BMWA
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Table 2: Summary statistics at the individual level and the firm level
Individual level Firm level
Accident in t (yes / no) 0.0069
(0.0829)
Accident in 2000–2006 (yes / no) 0.3293
(0.4700)
Moderate accident in t (yes / no) 0.3698
(0.4828)
Severe accident in t (yes / no) 0.0411
(0.1985)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0128 0.0153
(0.0192) (0.0275)
Unemployment rate 0.0504 0.0529
(0.0281) (0.0306)
Age 37.3941 37.3478
(6.8500) (2.1379)
Tenure (in 10 years) 0.9221 0.8414
(0.7194) (0.4264)
Experience (in 10 years) 1.8069 1.7413
(0.7423) (0.3316)
Sickness rate (last 2 years) 0.0031 0.0028
(0.0207) (0.0048)
Daily wage (in e) 81.2243 74.6025
(18.3017) (13.6947)
Number of worker-month observations 9,263,282
Number of workers 205,170
Number of firm-month observations 86,530
Number of firms 1,256
Notes: (a) Standard deviation in parentheses. (b) Sample Selection workers: male, blue–collar workers,
aged 25–49 years and employed in firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees
over the sample period from 2000–2006. (c) Sample Selection firms: Firms (manufacturing sector) with
on average at least 100 employees over the sample period from 2000–2006; all variables refer to the male,
blue-collar workforce aged 25–49. (d) Source: Own Calculations, based on AUVA, ASSD, and BMWA
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Table 3: Regression results for testing the crucial model assumption
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker is laid off)
Mean 0.0075
Standard deviation 0.0861
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
moderate accident 0.0016
in t ∈ [t− 12, t− 1] (0.0001)
severe accident 0.0002
in t ∈ [t− 12, t− 1] (0.0006)
any accident 0.0011 0.0015 0.0008 0.0015
in t ∈ [t− 12, t− 1] (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
unemployment rate 0.0189 0.1386 0.0833 0.1589 0.1589
(0.0016) (0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0070)
sickness rate (last 2 years) 0.0778 0.0436 0.0637 0.0413 0.0419
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0061)
sickness rate (last 2 years)2 −0.0655 −0.0028 −0.0455 0.0016 0.0007
(0.0188) (0.0232) (0.0185) (0.0232) (0.0232)
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 7,883,354
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All regressions
(linear probability model) include the following control variables (not shown in the table): calendar month
dummies, year dummies, age (and its square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its square), logarithm
of daily wage (in e). (c) Sample selection: male, blue–collar workers, aged 25–49 years and employed in
firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the sample period from 2000-2006.
(d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on workers). (e) Sample is restricted to
the years 2001–2006 due to the 1 year lag in workers’ workplace accidents. (f) Source: Own Calculations,
based on AUVA, ASSD, and BMWA.
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Table 4: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at
individual level)
Panel A: Moderate Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0065
Standard deviation 0.0804
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0006 −0.0072 −0.0084 −0.0074
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
[0.0042] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0019]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,259,374
Panel B: Severe Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0004
Standard deviation 0.0206
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,203,110
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All regressions
(linear probability model) include the following control variables: calendar month dummies, year dummies,
age (and its square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its square), logarithm of daily wage (in e),
sick leave rate in the previous two years (and its square). (c) Sample selection: male blue–collar workers,
aged 25–49 years and employed at firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over
the sample period from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (round brackets: adjusted for
clustering on workers; squared brackets: adjusted for clustering on firms). (e) Source: Own Calculations,
based on AUVA and ASSD.
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Table 5: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at firm
level)
Panel A: Moderate Accidents
Dummy variable
(= 1 if firm faces an accident)
Mean 0.3698
Standard deviation 0.4828
(1) (2)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) −0.0212 −0.2066
(0.0793) (0.0743)
Firm fixed-effects No Yes
N (firm-months obs.) 86,530
Panel B: Severe Accidents
Dummy variable
(= 1 if firm faces an accident)
Mean 0.0411
Standard deviation 0.1985
(1) (2)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0515 −0.0293
(0.0288) (0.0322)
Firm fixed-effects No Yes
N (firm-months obs.) 86,530
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All regressions
(linear probability model) include additionally the following control variables: calendar month dummies,
year dummies, the number of male blue–collar workers aged 25–49 in the firm (in logs), and the firm average
of employees’ age (and its square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its square), logarithm of daily
wage (in e) of this group of workers. (c) Sample selection: male, blue–collar workers, aged 25–49 years and
employed in firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the sample period
from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on firms). (e) Source:
Own Calculations, based on AUVA and ASSD.
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Table 6: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at
individual level); commuting accidents excluded
Panel A: Moderate Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0062
Standard deviation 0.0782
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0013 −0.0068 −0.0081 −0.0071
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
[0.0041] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0018]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,259,864
Panel B: Severe Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0004
Standard deviation 0.0193
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0009 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,206,285
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All regressions
(linear probability model) include the following control variables: calendar month dummies, year dummies,
age (and its square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its square), logarithm of daily wage (in e),
sick leave rate in the previous two years (and its square). (c) Sample selection: male blue–collar workers,
aged 25–49 years and employed at firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over
the sample period from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (round brackets: adjusted for
clustering on workers; squared brackets: adjusted for clustering on firms). (e) Source: Own Calculations,
based on AUVA and ASSD.
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Table 7: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at
individual level): no year fixed effects
Panel A: Moderate Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0065
Standard deviation 0.0804
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0014 −0.0072 −0.0074 −0.0074
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
[0.0042] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0019]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,259,374
Panel B: Severe Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0004
Standard deviation 0.0206
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0008 −0.0006 −0.0004 −0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,203,110
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All regressions
(linear probability model) include the following control variables: calendar month dummies, age (and its
square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its square), logarithm of daily wage (in e), sick leave
rate in the previous two years (and its square). (c) Sample selection: male blue–collar workers, aged 25–49
years and employed at firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the sample
period from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (round brackets: adjusted for clustering
on workers; squared brackets: adjusted for clustering on firms). (e) Source: Own Calculations, based on
AUVA and ASSD.
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Table 8: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at
individual level); no observations dropped
Panel A: Moderate Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0065
Standard deviation 0.0803
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0006 −0.0072 −0.0084 −0.0074
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
[0.0042] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0019]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,263,282
Panel B: Severe Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable (= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0004
Standard deviation 0.0205
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
N (worker-months obs.) 9,263,282
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All regressions
(linear probability model) include the following control variables: calendar month dummies, age (and its
square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its square), logarithm of daily wage (in e), sick leave
rate in the previous two years (and its square). (c) Sample selection: male blue–collar workers, aged 25–49
years and employed at firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the sample
period from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (round brackets: adjusted for clustering
on workers; squared brackets: adjusted for clustering on firms). (e) Source: Own Calculations, based on
AUVA and ASSD.
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